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Phillipson’s Hume in Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment
James A. Harris
Department of Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
ABSTRACT
The subject of this paper is the place of Hume in Nicholas Phillipson’s
account of the Scottish Enlightenment. I begin with Phillipson’s reading
of Hume as ‘civic moralist’. I then turn to his account of Hume the
author of The History of England. And from there I proceed to the place
of Hume in his intellectual biography of Adam Smith. I conclude with a
brief description of Phillipson’s understanding of Hume’s place in the
history of the Scottish Enlightenment as it mutated in the late
eighteenth century and came to an end in the early nineteenth. I show
how just as Phillipson’s Hume cannot be understood apart from the
Scottish Enlightenment, so also Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment





1. The origins of the Scottish enlightenment
In some of his earliest published work Nicholas Phillipson developed a powerful explanation of why
a small country on the northern fringe of Europe, hundreds of miles from the capital of the larger
state of which it was a part, became the site of major contributions to the trans-national project that
we now call the Enlightenment.1 The origins of enlightenment in Scotland, Phillipson argued, lay in
the trauma of the 1707 Union of Parliaments, an event which in turn had its causes in the traumas
that had followed the Williamite Revolution of 1688–89. The departure for London of the Scottish
Parliament, and with it the greater figures of the Scottish aristocracy, had caused a crisis of identity
among the minor aristocracy and gentry who found themselves left behind in an Edinburgh now
stripped of political function. The fierce debate that preceded the Union had imbued all Scots
with an urgent sense of their country’s poverty and need of improvement, and also of its lack of
economic independence. In the 1710s and 1720s there developed a sense among what was left of
Scotland’s elite that they needed to prevent their country from being economically and culturally
overwhelmed by its much larger neighbour to the south, and, after a brief phase of Jacobite discon-
tent, they set about devising institutions which would replace Parliament as a means of satisfying
the demand for a measure of autonomy and self-determination. These ‘para-parliamentary’ insti-
tutions, as Phillipson called them, were the clubs and societies in which the young and ambitious
could fashion for themselves the role of leaders actively addressing the moral, political, and econ-
omic questions faced by Scotland in the Hanoverian age. These Scotsmen, on Phillipson’s account,
sought self-consciously to find an ideological substitute for political independence, and they found
it in the drive to renovate Scotland’s agriculture, manufactures, and commerce. At the same time,
they theorised what they were doing in terms of the devising of a new understanding of what it was
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to be a virtuous and patriotic Scot. This was their reply to Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun’s prediction
that in the absence of a properly federal political structure for Great Britain, Scotland would lose
touch with its distinctive culture and history.
Phillipson wrote his first essays on the Scottish Enlightenment as a self-described ‘social histor-
ian’ with a keen interest in the dynamics and development of institutions. By the early 1980s, how-
ever, he had combined this historical perspective with that of the new history of political thought
that had been conceived at Cambridge at the time when he had been a postgraduate student there,
but that did not have a discernible impact of his own doctoral research on the Court of Session in
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Prominent in his contributions to the now classic
collections The Enlightenment in National Context (1981) and Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of
Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (1983) is the language of civic moralism introduced
into the history of British moral and political thought by J. G. A. Pocock.2 The literati of the Scottish
Enlightenment are placed in a tradition of reflection on the nature of virtue that had begun, in Brit-
ain, with the neo-Machiavellian republicanism of James Harrington. The question for them, as for
all Britons in the modern era of commerce, was how to find an alternative to old ideas of civic virtue
that had centred on military service and independence derived from the ownership of land. One
way of looking at the Scottish Enlightenment, Phillipson now suggested, was as ‘a critique of the
classic language of civic morality’.3 Describing himself now as an intellectual historian, Phillipson
declared that he liked to think of the ‘Scottish social philosophers’ not as moral philosophers
inspired by the methods of natural philosophy, but rather ‘as practical moralists who had developed
a formidable and complex casuistical armoury to instruct young men of middling rank in their
duties as men and as citizens of a modern commercial polity’.4 A key influence on the Scottish mor-
alists was the model of politeness explored with such success by Joseph Addison and Richard Steele
in The Tatler and The Spectator. Addison and Steele were influential everywhere, of course. What
was distinctive of their reception in Scotland was that their readers there believed that the kind of
sociability that they both described and prescribed could teach, as Phillipson put it, ‘the principles of
civic virtue as well as of propriety’.5
My subject in this paper is the place of Hume in Phillipson’s account of the Scottish Enlighten-
ment. Inevitably Phillipson’s approach to Hume was oriented by the work of Duncan Forbes, whose
course on the Scottish Enlightenment Phillipson took while he was at Cambridge, and whose still
unsurpassed study Hume’s Philosophical Politics was published in 1975. For Phillipson, Forbes had
comprehensively demolished the nineteenth-century myth of Hume’s Toryism, and, with the con-
cept of ‘sceptical Whiggism’, had provided the only sensible way of approaching Hume in his eight-
eenth-century context.6 But Phillipson was very far from a mere acolyte of Forbes. He was
interested in things that Forbes was not interested in, especially, as we will see below, in so far as
he tried to trace connections between Hume’s ‘philosophy’ – his sceptical epistemology – and
his moral and political thought. Phillipson’s Hume is, as Forbes’s Hume is not, a moral philosopher
in the full eighteenth-century sense of the term. I begin where Phillipson began, with Hume as ‘civic
moralist’. I then turn to Hume the author of The History of England. And from there I proceed to
Hume as influence on the intellectual biography of Adam Smith. I conclude with a brief summary
account of Phillipson’s understanding of Hume’s place in the history of the Scottish Enlightenment
as it mutated in the late eighteenth century and came to an end in the early nineteenth. In this con-
nection, I say something about the synoptic work on the Scottish Enlightenment that Phillipson was
working on in the final years of his life but did not live to complete. I mean to show how just as
Phillipson’s Hume cannot be understood apart from the Scottish Enlightenment, so also Phillip-
son’s Scottish Enlightenment cannot be understood without Hume.
2. Hume as civic moralist
Phillipson’s first publication on Hume, ‘Hume as Moralist: A Social Historian’s Perspective’ (1979),
had its origin in a lecture given at the Royal Institute of Philosophy in 1977–78 as part of a series
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with the title ‘Philosophers of the Enlightenment’. Another lecture in the series was given by Dun-
can Forbes, and a comparison of Phillipson’s contribution with that of his erstwhile teacher is
instructive. Ever the contrarian, Forbes told his audience that ‘[j]ust as one must rescue Adam
Smith from the economists if one is to see him whole and in a historical context, so one must rescue
Hume from the philosophers’.7 The Hume that Forbes was interested in, Hume the social and pol-
itical theorist, had little in common with the Hume that philosophers were interested in, and a his-
torical approach to Hume, as conducted by Forbes, did not concern itself with trying to make sense
of Hume’s writings on society and politics in terms of his writings on epistemology and metaphy-
sics. The historian looked instead to intellectual and political context. As Forbes had put it in
Hume’s Philosophical Politics (1975), ‘a more truly historical approach to the history of political
thought’ was in part ‘an attempt to counter the tendency to rely almost entirely on internal lines
of communication in the interpretation of a given thinker’ – ‘which in Hume’s case usually
means trying to connect everything to his philosophy, as though he lived in a cocoon of his own
spinning’.8 The first two books of A Treatise of Human Nature barely figure in the story told in
Hume’s Philosophical Politics.
Phillipson, by contrast, was keenly interested in the ‘internal lines of communication’ that con-
nect Hume’s works. At the start of ‘Hume as Moralist’ he presents himself as a ‘historian who wants
to understand Hume’s development as a philosopher, to locate his thought within a specific, Scot-
tish context and to arrive at some understanding of his surprisingly cordial relations with the lit-
erary and social world of enlightened Edinburgh’.9 Understanding Hume’s development as a
philosopher meant explaining Hume’s decision to give up systematic philosophising in favour of
essay writing as something other than a move from one kind of interesting intellectual project to
another – and also, of course, as something more than unprincipled bid for fame and fortune.
On Phillipson’s reading, a ‘preoccupation with civic morality’ was central to both the Treatise
and the essays that Hume wrote immediately after he abandoned the project of an all-encompassing
science of man. Hume’s letters tell us that he had a long-standing interest in practical morality, and
his essays were the result of a decision ‘to develop the central principles of the Treatise as a practical
moralist anxious to reach an understanding of morality which was founded on the principles of
human nature and not on the whims of a moralist’.10 In the final section of Book One of the Trea-
tise, moreover, Phillipson, finds a rationale for an investigation of the dynamics of the social world
that, on Hume’s account, saves the sceptic from himself. It is striking that the historian Phillipson is
just as sure as philosophers tend to be that Hume’s first book was also his ‘greatest’ book.11
I will return below to the lines of communication linking Hume’s books, and in particular to the
connections between the Essays (and the Treatise) and theHistory of England. Now, though, I move
on to the ‘specific, Scottish context’ in which Hume’s thought is to be located, and to the place of
Hume’s practical moralising in Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment. In his contribution to the
Enlightenment in National Context collection, having described Hume as ‘the pivotal figure in
the history of the Scottish Enlightenment’, Phillipson makes the following rather remarkable claim:
No one was more concerned [than Hume] with the moral wellbeing of his contemporaries; no one was more
sensitive to the language of contemporary morals and politics. No one did more to develop a language of civic
morality that would help his contemporaries to understand themselves and the principles on which modern
society was organized and, by so doing, help them to lead happier, more virtuous lives.12
Here Phillipson dramatically narrows the divide that many, including in some moods Hume him-
self, have perceived to separate Hume from his more obviously practically orientated contempor-
aries. This is not a detached, disengaged Hume content to concern himself with the anatomy of
human nature and of society, willing to leave to men like Hutcheson, Turnbull, Kames, and Fergu-
son the painterly work of teaching the conduct of the passions and the regulation of behaviour.
Instead it is a Hume wholly committed to the project of renovating civic virtue along the lines indi-
cated by Addison and Steele in the Spectator. Furthermore, Phillipson’s Hume shares the distinctive
concern of his fellow Scots with looking beyond the private world of family and friends to the
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public, civil consequences of the improvement of manners. As did the Spectator, Hume’s essays pre-
sented sociability and conversation as the means whereby to achieve, in Phillipson’s phrase, ‘ease,
contentment, and a sense of ego’,13 but the conversations Hume intended to encourage would take
place in the quintessentially Scottish Enlightenment ‘para-parliamentary’ context of the society or
club. These would be conversations that were both about the means of economic and cultural
improvement of the nation, and that were also, in themselves, a means whereby the nation’s man-
ners might be polished. Nor more than any of his contemporaries does Phillipson’s Hume doubt
that virtue and happiness are necessarily connected. ‘For Hume’, as Phillipson puts it,
virtue consisted in teaching ourselves to be critical of our beliefs, [in] learning how to review them in the light
of the experience which had brought them to life. Cultivating sceptical habits of this sort would help to release
men from the bondage of myth and prejudice which corrupted the mind and generated enthusiasms which
could stand in the way of human happiness.14
It is a great virtue of this approach to Hume that it does indeed help us to understand the friendly
relations that, despite his reputation for religious scepticism, Hume maintained with the literary
and social world of enlightened Edinburgh. ‘He had adopted’, Phillipson explains,
a mode of philosophizing that was in itself of great importance to the Scots and it allowed Edinburgh’s social
and literary élite to treat him with the respect that any society accords to a man whose work is deemed to be of
public importance.15
Hume’s friendships, in other words, were based on more than the charm and good humour docu-
mented so liberally by E. C. Mossner in his biography of Hume.16 He was not valued despite his
books, but because of them, and also because of his practical contributions to the cultural life of
Scotland’s capital. There is no difference, on Phillipson’s reading, between the Hume of the Treatise
and the Essays and the Hume who was a founder member of the Select Society, who was secretary of
the Philosophical Society, and who was librarian to the Faculty of Advocates.
Nonetheless, Phillipson is attentive to what was distinctive about Hume’s civic moralism, which
he characterises in terms of its political dimension. Unlike Addison and Steele themselves, Hume
supplemented appeals for the moderation of party zeal with a political philosophy. The essays, on
Phillipson’s account, were ‘designed to illustrate and develop’ the main thesis of Book Three of the
Treatise, ‘that liberty, commerce, refinement and progress in the arts and sciences only arose in
countries with good laws and constitutions and were thus dependent upon them for their survi-
val’.17 Good laws and constitutions were those that preserved peace and protected property through
the strict enforcement of justice. It was only given the maintenance of law and order that it was
meaningful to talk in terms of a civil liberty. The purpose of government, then, was the provision
of authority and power sufficient to compel adherence to the conventions upon which the very
possibility of society fundamentally depended. It was not, or at least not principally, the realisation
of an abstract conception of freedom. Hume’s political essays, that is, were intended not only to
expose the incoherence of the factional arguments that divided Whigs and Tories, but also to
teach ‘how to hold one’s instinctive political enthusiasms in check by thinking of one’s political
duty in relation to the sole end of maintaining the rules of justice’.18 From the perspective
Hume was trying to cultivate in his reader, supposedly fundamental matters of political principle
mattered much less than was generally believed. Indeed, the distinction between ‘free’ and ‘absolute’
governments mattered much less than was generally believed. It was perfectly possible for peace to
be preserved and property protected under an absolute government such as France’s. Modern mon-
archies had, as Hume put it, become ‘civilised’, and needed only technical adjustment, for instance
in the collection of taxes, in order to become comparable, in respect of the basic concerns of politics,
with countries like Great Britain and the Dutch Republic. In his later work on Hume, as will be seen
in Section 3 below, Phillipson calls this the politics of prudence, as contrasted with the politics of
principle.19
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In modern, post-Union, Britain an essential element of political prudence, as described by Phil-
lipson, was respect on the part of London politicians for the specificities of the province. As the
terms of the Union had recognised, there was no possibility of enforcing a single religious and
legal culture on the whole of Britain, and no point in attempting to do so. Phillipson’s Hume is
keenly sensitive to the complexities of the new state that the Union had created, and this enables
Phillipson to make sense of what can otherwise seem an obscure and unmotivated text, the
essay, or discourse, ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’. Phillipson reports Hume’s view as having
been that ‘[n]o commercial society could be stable…whose government did not recognize and
respect the variety of its social and regional structure’.20 Thus Hume’s description of a perfect com-
monwealth ‘stressed the importance of preserving the integrity of local communities and of main-
taining a carefully balanced relationship between central and local government if political stability
and happiness were to be preserved’.21 Phillipson does not, though, explore the very obvious struc-
tural differences between the Harringtonian and Fletcherian utopia described in the essay and the
form of government actually in place in eighteenth-century Britain. In David Hume: The Philoso-
pher as Historian, he describes ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’ as, merely, a reflection on Hume’s
part ‘on ways in which the constitution could be regularized and perfected in the future’.22
At the heart of the politics of prudence espoused by Phillipson’s Hume is the idea, shared by
all of the men of the first generation of Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment, that commercial suc-
cess was the means whereby Scotland would secure an acceptable degree of independence in its
relations with its much larger neighbour to the south. Hume’s new language of civic morality was
designed first and foremost to explain to his fellow Scots how it was that the commercial life
could be at the same time a virtuous life, a life of self-realisation and self-determination. It
was also, we might add, designed to help them understand commerce, and to free them from
the misunderstandings, for example about the relation between money and national prosperity,
to which those with no knowledge of economics are naturally prone. On Phillipson’s account,
Edinburgh’s Select Society was where Scots came to terms with the case made by Hume for vir-
tue and happiness through trade. ‘It is in the history of the Select Society’, Phillipson claims, ‘that
the true extent of Hume’s influence on Scottish culture can best be seen’.23 The wording of the
questions debated at the Society ‘indicates that they had been chosen by men who were respon-
sive to a peculiarly Scottish language of civic morality and to the writing of Hume’.24 These were
questions on the role of law, political institutions, economic management and culture, debated in
terms of the nation, the country, and the people, with regard to utility, public advantage, and
happiness. This, Phillipson comments, ‘was the language of Scottish politics, fortified by that
of Hume’.25 The implication, however, is not that Hume’s contemporaries agreed with all of
his views. Sometimes fierce debate about, in particular, the question of a Scottish militia and
the reform of the law of entails is evidence that while Phillipson’s Hume may have done
much to set the terms of debate at the Select Society, there was never a Humean orthodoxy
to which the Scottish literati adhered.
3. Hume as historian
In 1989 Phillipson published Hume, his contribution to the short-lived Weidenfeld series ‘Histor-
ians on Historians’.26 The book was reissued by Penguin, with only minor changes, to coincide with
the Hume tercentenary in 2011, now with the title David Hume: The Philosopher as Historian.
What, on Phillipson’s reading, was the connection between Hume’s practical moralism and his
decision to embark on – in the first instance – a history of Great Britain from 1603 in 1688? The
answer to this question lies in Hume’s attitude toward religion, something that Phillipson, in
order to bring out the commonalities between Hume and the other members of the first phase
of the Scottish Enlightenment, leaves in the background in early essays like ‘Hume as Moralist’
and ‘The Scottish Enlightenment’. David Hume makes it clear that Phillipson did not in any
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sense downplay the significance of Hume’s religious scepticism. On the contrary. ‘[I]t is impossible’,
Phillipson claims,
to understand the subtle interplay of scepticism, science and history in Hume’s thought unless one remembers
that his account of the principles of human nature [in the Treatise] was not only secular but planned and exe-
cuted as a devastating attack on Christianity.27
For reasons never made entirely clear, Phillipson read Hume’s demolition of rationalist assump-
tions about the basis and reach of human cognition as in itself an assault on the Christian religion.
Book One of the Treatise, therefore, was all about religion, even while Hume made no explicit men-
tion of religious issues there. The same went for Book Three’s critique of rationalism in moral phil-
osophy. Taken as a whole, the Treatise primed Hume to see religion as the source of the politics of
principle that the responsible civic moralist sought to replace with a politics of prudence. In David
Hume, of all of Hume’s essays, it is ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’ that is ‘the most remarkable’.28
‘Its main purpose’, Phillipson explains, ‘was to analyse the political implications of religious thought
and to show that both superstition and enthusiasm had potentially disastrous consequences for pol-
itical stability’.29 And its implications were so significant that it took Hume himself a decade or
more to ‘digest’ it and ‘realiz[e] that the apocalyptic power of religious enthusiasm was the only
force which was capable of destroying men’s natural loyalties to a government which they had
no other reason to disobey’.30
The key insight arrived at by Hume in his work on the first volume of theHistory of Great Britain
was thus that ‘so far from being a conflict about the constitution, the Civil War had been a war of
religion’.31 This idea, in fact, was the animating principle of all of Hume’s history writing. The heart
of the History of England taken as a whole, as Phillipson reads it, is Volume Five. ‘[T]he history of
the early Stuarts’, he claims, ‘was where the intellectual excitement lay’.32 Here Phillipson was in
accord with Duncan Forbes, who had published Volume One of the History of Great Britain as a
self-standing book, and who had claimed that all the volumes published later ‘must have been com-
paratively an anti-climax’.33 The story that Hume set out to tell was of the destruction of the Tudor
constitution on the part of religious fanatics who single-mindedly exploited the imprudence and
naivety of James I and his son. James’s great weakness was for precisely the kind of philosophical,
or theological, discussion that, according to Phillipson’s Hume, a king was well advised to avoid.
This brought matters of high principle to the centre-stage of English politics, where they could
be used to cataclysmic effect by the leaders of a House of Commons that was not, as Whigs
liked to claim, an assembly of legalistic constitutionalists attempting to defend an ancient settlement
from royal aggression, but rather a ‘a wealthy, powerful class, newly released from a state of feudal
dependence and in search of political identity’.34 The climax of their campaign was the Petition of
Right, which Charles, out of his depth and unaware of what was really going on, reluctantly con-
sented to and so sanctioned a revolutionary change of government that the Civil War turned
from idea to reality. Throughout the 1630s and 1640s it was religious enthusiasm that kept this pro-
cess of political upheaval going, constantly subverting natural habits of obedience, transmuting dis-
satisfaction and disquiet into armed rebellion. The tragic irony that Phillipson’s Hume delights in
most is the fact that Charles was to such a great extent the author of his own downfall, in his encour-
agement of the Laudian reforms that kept the fires of Puritan outrage burning.
One way of understanding Hume’s decision to go backwards in time rather than forwards once
he had finished his history of the Stuarts is, on Phillipson’s reading, in terms of the contrast between
the mistakes of the kings of the seventeenth century and the great prudence of Elizabeth. Hume gave
Elizabeth a volume to herself in order to show what prudent government, unconcerned with mat-
ters of principle, focused exclusively on the restraint of zealotry and the prevention of religious
conflict, looks like. The story of the Tudor period as a whole is, in Hume’s hands, that of the cre-
ation of an effective and popular absolute monarchy out of the ruins of feudalism. And on Phillip-
son’s reading, Hume’s argument here connected directly with the claims made in the earlier
political essays about the lack of importance, in the age of modern monarchy, of the distinction
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between absolute and free forms of government. ‘Henry [VIII] and Wolsey’, Phillipson goes so far
as to say, ‘seemed unwittingly to be laying the foundations of that most desirable Humean form of
government, a civilized absolute monarchy’.35 Hume then went back even further in English history
in order to explain how the scene was set for the innovations of the Tudors – by showing how the
limited monarchy built into the feudal system proved itself to be ‘incapable of sustaining regular
and civilized government’.36
At the end of David Hume Phillipson describes Hume’s achievement as the fashioning of ‘the
first genuinely political history of England’.37 The History was a study of the ever-changing char-
acter of the political prudence necessary to the successful manipulation of the behaviour of man-
kind. It was written in the conviction that ‘the history of civilization must begin and end with
politics’ – in the sense that ‘[t]he unique capacity of human beings to create and obey governments
was the key to the civilizing process, the key that had the power to unlock a people’s capacity for
justice, humanity and wisdom’.38 The climax of Hume’s story was the Revolution of 1688, but
Hume defied his reader’s expectations with regard to that epochal event in what was, surely inten-
tionally, a dismayingly problematic account of how power was transferred from James II to William
and Mary. For the upshot of Hume’s recounting of the events of early 1689 was that ‘[t]he political
prudence of a self-interested usurper, not the wisdom of Parliament, had saved Britain from a new
civil war’.39 Phillipson saw Hume’s deeply sceptical account of the Revolution as having had clear,
and troubling, implications for the question, still very much alive even in the 1750s, of the exact
basis of the obligation of Britons to the line of kings placed on the English and Scottish thrones
by the Act of Succession.40 Phillipson was much less sure than Forbes that Hume’s intention
was, in Forbes’s words, ‘to give the established, Hanoverian, regime a proper intellectual foun-
dation’.41 On the other hand, Phillipson agreed with Forbes that the History of England demanded
to be read as an episode in the history of political thought. There is very little in David Hume, or
anywhere else in Phillipson’s work, on the formal and stylistic problems which Hume the historian
set out to solve.
The emphasis on prudence serves to differentiate Phillipson’s interpretation of the History also
from that of (usually American) Hume scholars who have seen it as, most importantly, a vindication
of a particular, proto-liberal, theory of liberty.42 On Phillipson’s reading, it is order, the enforcement
of law and the protection of property, that is the supreme Humean political value. Liberty only has
meaning, and value, in the context of the establishment and preservation of order. And the
elevation of liberty to the status of prime political goal is not only a misunderstanding of the
aims of politics, but is also highly dangerous – as was shown clearly by the Wilkite movement in
England in the late 1760s. Thus the late essay that Hume wrote in response to the ‘Wilkes and Lib-
erty’ riots, ‘Of the Origin of Government’, with its argument for authority as the necessary political
counterpart to liberty, was meant ‘to recapitulate and reinforce the central principles of his political
thought and his political teaching’.43 The History of England, in fact, began as a demonstration of
the consequences, as illustrated in England in the run up to the Civil War, of elevating liberty above
order as a political aim. An abstract idea of freedom had all too easily combined with religious
enthusiasm in order to corrode the natural habits of deference and obedience upon which peace
and security always and everywhere ultimately depend. The idea, then, that there might be an
easy and short path from Hume to the ideals that animated the American Revolution was therefore,
according to Phillipson, seriously misguided. That was not the way in which to understand Hume’s
remark that he was ‘an American in [his] Principles’.44
The Hume who wrote theHistory of Englandwas, as described by Phillipson, very much a Briton,
rather than a Scot. The particularities of the Scottish Enlightenment, so richly described in the
essays Phillipson wrote in the 1970s and early 1980s, are not prominent in David Hume. The
impression given is that, by the time he turned to history writing, Hume saw himself as an actor
on a larger stage, addressing a pan-British, if not pan-European, audience. The political questions
explored in the History were not problems specific to the province that the Union, on Phillipson’s
account, had turned Scotland into. Even so, Phillipson’s Hume brings something distinctively
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Scottish to the answering of those questions. It took a Scot, with a Scot’s awareness of the potenti-
alities of the Union, to see ‘that commerce had the power to civilize, that its roots lay in the modern
world and that it required new political institutions and a new culture to support it’. It took a Scot to
supplement Defoe’s apology for modern Whiggism with an explanation of ‘why the roots of civi-
lisation were modern and why civilization had been impossible in the early ages of English history’.
What Hume offered the English, in sum, was ‘a truly Scottish understanding of the foundations of
the modern constitution and the effects of commerce on its development’.45
4. Hume as influence on Adam Smith
In 2010 Phillipson published what would turn out to be his last major work, Adam Smith: An
Enlightened Life. It was a worldwide success, garnering positive reviews in dozens of journals
and newspapers. Hume figures prominently in the book’s narrative, to the extent that Smith is
described at one point as nothing less than ‘the perfect Humean’.46 It is worth noting, though,
that in his earlier work, the relationship between the two Scottish philosophers is described in
different terms. In 1981 Phillipson had asserted that it is in Smith’s work ‘that the rich potenti-
alities of the Scottish language of civic morality is [sic] most clearly visible’.47 The Theory of Moral
Sentiments was an examination ‘of the process by which men’s moral sentiments and their ideas of
propriety and virtue were shaped in the ordinary process of social interaction’.48 Its disconcerting
conclusion was that in the last resort virtue was no different from propriety, ‘moulded subtly and
insensibly by social experience’.49 This interpretation of Smith was then significantly expanded
upon in Phillipson’s contribution to Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff’s Wealth and Virtue col-
lection, ‘Adam Smith as Civic Moralist’ (1983). There too Phillipson argued that the Theory of
Moral Sentiments ‘is best seen, not as a general theory of morals, but as an account of the process
by which men living in commercial society acquire moral ideas and may be taught how to
improve them’.50 Smith’s work was, in a sense, the culmination of the Scottish attempt to work
out an alternative to the libertarian, political, martial virtues of the classical republican tradition.
Interestingly, in this later piece Phillipson altered his reading of Smith in order to acknowledge
the important fact that for Smith there was a crucial difference between mere propriety, doing
what those around you expect you to do, and virtue in the full sense of the word. In this amend-
ment to Addisonianism, according to Phillipson, Smith followed Hume.51 Yet it could not be said
that the Smith described in this essay owed very much more than this to Hume. Phillipson high-
lights the importance to Smith of the rejection of rationalism in morals, but of course that was a
move that had been made first by Hutcheson, and which Hume, in Part One of Book Three of the
Treatise, had done no more than reiterate. As in his work on the Scottish Enlightenment more
generally, Phillipson attaches importance to what he here terms ‘regionalism’, and claims that
there are respects in which Smith’s remarks on the topic ‘recall the work of [his] two most influ-
ential Scottish predecessors in the field of political writing, Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun and David
Hume’.52 Again, the text of Hume’s in which Phillipson is most interested here is ‘Idea of a Perfect
Commonwealth’.
In his next published essay on Smith, ‘Language, Sociability, and History: Some Reflections on
the Foundations on the Foundations of Adam Smith’s Science of Man’ (2000), Phillipson has more
to say about the positive impact on Smith of Hutcheson’s teaching at Glasgow, and, concomitantly,
more to say also about ways in which Smith disagreed with Hume. Phillipson is willing to accept
contemporary rumours that Smith read the Treatise of Human Nature during his sojourn in Oxford
as Snell Exhibitioner, but now judges that Hume’s philosophy ‘pointed towards a cool moral scepti-
cism which Smith was to find unsatisfying’.53 Also, and crucially, the Smith described by Phillipson
in this essay regarded Hume’s version of the science of man as vitiated by a serious philosophical
weakness, in the form of its almost total neglect of language. ‘We shall never know’, Phillipson
remarks,
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why Hume failed to develop the theory of language which would have given theoretical depth to his science of
man; perhaps he felt that he had done enough to justify turning from the natural history of man to the civil
history of his own country and to important questions about the preservation of liberty in contemporary
Britain.54
Phillipson goes on to describe the ways in which Smith, inspired principally by Condillac, interpel-
lated language into Humean moral philosophy. Smith ‘realised the satisfaction of moral need was a
matter of learning to deploy language effectively’.55 He also moved decisively away from Hutcheson
with his concept of the impartial spectator, defined not as a faculty of the mind, analogous to the
moral sense, but rather as ‘another fiction generated by rhetoric, language, and the imagination’.56
In Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life, by contrast, the young Smith’s encounter with the Treatise
‘was to be the decisive event in his intellectual development, providing him with the resource he
could use to lay the foundation of a philosophy and a deep and enduring friendship’; and by the
time Hume and Smith met in 1749 or 1750, ‘Smith was a committed Humean who was using
Hume’s theory of human nature in a highly distinctive way to lay the foundation of his own phil-
osophy’.57 Smith’s theory of language ‘reinforced’Hume’s theory of knowledge.58 His jurisprudence
‘was derived from a theory or rights borrowed from Hume’.59 Smith and Hume are described as
having had a ‘joint project’60, a project which Hume took as far as the sketch of the elements of
a science of political economy laid out in Political Discourses, and which Smith took forwards in
The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. In the former, and in response
above all to Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, ‘Smith decided to present his
moral philosophy as a means of providing a philosophical defence of Hume’s claim that commerce
had the power to improve and perfect the human personality’.61 In the latter, Smith had been shown
by Hume ‘how to develop an account of the progress of civilization which paid as much attention to
the material, moral and intellectual progress of humanity as to the lamentable story of the follies of
so many of its rulers’.62 The theories of money and of taxation in theWealth of Nations were largely
elaborations of ideas of Hume’s, and the questions about debt answered in the book had been
Hume’s questions first.
The internal dynamics of Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment are more complex in Adam Smith
than in his earlier work. In 1973 Phillipson was able to claim that ‘there is an important sense in
which the history of the Scottish Enlightenment is the history of Edinburgh’.63 Work on Smith’s
intellectual biography appears to have persuaded him that there was enlightenment worthy of
the name elsewhere in Scotland. Chapter Two of Adam Smith is titled ‘Glasgow, Glasgow University
and Hutcheson’s Enlightenment’, and in that chapter Phillipson carefully distinguishes the form of
enlightenment specific to Scotland’s second city from that of the capital. Lacking – until the 1750s –
the clubs and societies that shaped the interplay of academic and civic life in Edinburgh, Glasgow’s
enlightenment was in the beginning an affair of the university and its professors, and at its heart was
engagement with continental European developments in metaphysics, natural philosophy, and,
especially, natural jurisprudence. Hutcheson’s revision of Pufendorf was, on the story Phillipson
tells, a crucial influence on the young Smith. And when Smith, at the behest of Henry Home of
Kames, went to Edinburgh in 1748 to give lectures on rhetoric and jurisprudence, he effected a
kind of cross-pollination of enlightenments, combining the intense interest in the basis of
human sociability he had developed in Glasgow with the interest in history characteristic of the
Edinburgh literati. In the account given of the early Edinburgh enlightenment in Adam Smith,
the improvement-orientated intellectual entrepreneurship of Henry Home is much more promi-
nent than the sceptical philosophising of David Hume. Indeed, the impression conveyed by Phil-
lipson’s account is that it fell to Smith to explain to the Edinburgh literati what were the full
philosophical implications of Hume’s critique of Hutcheson’s critique of Pufendorf, as if it had
taken someone on the outside of the Edinburgh Enlightenment to appreciate the proper signifi-
cance of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature.
Phillipson’s ‘conjectural history’ of Smith’s Edinburgh lectures is a remarkable tour de force and
one of the highlights of Adam Smith. Immediately after the lectures, Phillipson reminds the reader,
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Smith found a place right at the heart of the Edinburgh Enlightenment, as vice-president of the re-
launched Philosophical Society, and then founder member of the Select Society. But he then moved
back to Glasgow, to return to Edinburgh as an inhabitant of the city only in the late 1770s, after the
publication of The Wealth of Nations and the death of Hume. Phillipson’s Smith and Hume
together, in their pursuit of the ‘joint project’ of a systematic and historicised science of man,
are portrayed in Adam Smith as relative outsiders in relation to the main concerns and activities
of the Edinburgh literati. In part, this is because of the religious scepticism that, as we have seen,
Phillipson believes to have been a defining component of that science of man. In Adam Smith Phil-
lipson restates his interpretation of the anti-rationalism of the Treatise as ‘an assault on the auth-
ority of all known forms of Christian theology’.64 Phillipson’s Smith is unique among the men of the
Scottish Enlightenment in so far as he had a stomach strong enough to digest Hume’s antipathy to
religion and to make positive use of the philosophical programme in which it was embedded. Thus
Smith’s two great published works ‘and indeed Smith’s entire project for a modern science of man
were built on the foundations of the Enlightenment’s quintessential assault on religion’.65 Phillipson
is careful not to say more than can responsibly be said about Smith’s personal attitude toward reli-
gion. Nevertheless, he describes Smith’s overall intellectual enterprise as ‘deeply Epicurean’, and, as
such, as an enterprise ‘shaped by Hume’s notably sceptical theory of knowledge, by his provocative
claim that the mind was, in the last resort, the Empire of the Imagination, and by that loathing of
priestcraft which had identified him in Europe as a philosopher bearing the mark of a true philo-
sophe’.66 Though Smith never shared Hume’s reputation as an infidel, Phillipson adds, ‘few Scots
were in any doubt where his religious sympathies lay’.67 Few Scots, moreover, if any, were able
to follow the Hume-Smith enterprise to its secular conclusions. Home, Hugh Blair, William Robert-
son, Thomas Reid, and Sir James Mackintosh are described by Phillipson as having baulked at the
supposed irreligiosity of Smith’s moral thought.
It is, of course, not possible to say for sure how Smith regarded Hume’s religious scepticism. Did
he refuse to take responsibility for the publication of the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion
because he objected to the book’s argument, or merely out of caution and prudence? We do not
know, and Phillipson does not claim otherwise. It is, however, possible to suspect that elsewhere
in Adam Smith Phillipson somewhat exaggerates the intellectual affinities between the author of
A Treatise of Human Nature and The History of England and the author of The Theory of Moral
Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. A ‘perfect Humean’ would not criticise the ethics of utility
as Smith does in Part Four of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, nor spend so long detailing the basis
and requirements of the sense of duty. There is much in Smith’s moral philosophy that demands to
be read as criticism of Hume, but Phillipson, with his eye on what Smith has to say in reply to Rous-
seau about the nature of the civilising process, does not focus on the complexities of Smith’s engage-
ment with Hume’s ethical writings. There is a similar tendency in the account given by Phillipson of
the intellectual origins of The Wealth of Nations. Hume is one of ‘two philosophers whose presence
pervades the entire book’ – the other is Quesnay.68 Yet this might be thought to pass over much of
the other reading that Smith did as he constructed the book’s argument.69 Phillipson quotes the
congratulatory letter sent by Hume on its publication, including the passage where Hume says
that were his friend here at his fireside, he would dispute some of his principles. But the reader
is left to guess what those principles might have been.
5. Hume in the development of Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment
Phillipson’s early work sketches not only an account of the origins and principal concerns of the
Scottish Enlightenment, but also a dialectical history of its development through the second half
of the eighteenth century, leading towards its conclusion early in the nineteenth. On this narrative,
the creation by Hume, Smith, and others of Edinburgh’s Select Society marks the culmination of the
first phase of the Enlightenment in Scotland. As we have seen above, Phillipson sees Hume’s con-
temporaries as having been able, for the most part, to put his religious scepticism to one side as they
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joined with him in the project of crafting a moral and political language with which Scots, in the
wake of the Union and despite it, were able to describe themselves as autonomous members of
the polity of Great Britain. There were, however, always anxieties about the commercial character
of this new Scotland and about the nonchalance with which traditional conceptions of virtue were
being consigned to the dustbin of history, anxieties articulated for example by Adam Ferguson in
his Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), and also by the later Smith, ‘depressed by illness and
the loss of his family and friends’, wondering, along with Hugh Blair in his commentary on Ossian,
‘whether philosophers were not condemned to understand the decline of a noble form of civilisation
which they were powerless to prevent’.70 Such worries were expressed most sharply by observers
from outside Edinburgh, most notably by James Beattie, for whom ‘Edinburgh had become part
of a Castle of Scepticism which was sapping the self-confidence of young men destined for a life
in the world of public affairs, destroying religion, morality and virtue’.71 Beattie was only one of
a group of Aberdonian professors alarmed by the sceptical tendencies of an Edinburgh dominated
by the philosophy of Hume. Reid moved to Glasgow in 1764, and there instituted what was self-con-
sciously crafted as a philosophy curriculum to answer Hume and his scepticism. The most signifi-
cant product of the Reidian school, according to Phillipson, was Dugald Stewart, who used Reid’s
version of the science of the mind as the basis for a new and different theory of modern citizenship,
an unapologetically elitist theory which ‘substituted the ideal of the virtuous expert for that the vir-
tuous citizen, and saw the attainment of wisdom as an alternative to participation in public affairs as
the key to preserving the happiness of mankind’.72 Stewart’s philosophy embodied the retreat of
Scotland’s intellectuals from the ideas of civic morality that had been their distinctive contribution
to Scottish culture, and the abandonment of the historical and sociological science of man that had
gained Scotland the respect of intellectuals across Europe and beyond.
Hume, obviously enough, is the force that propels Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment forwards,
towards Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the ultimate product of the philosophical culture of the Select
Society, as well as towards Beattie’s Essay on Truth, Reid’s philosophy of common sense, and Stew-
art’s refashioning of the theory of virtuous citizenship. Phillipson was just as attentive to the latter
story as to the former.73 Among his early publications is a brilliant evocation of the frame of mind –
anxious to the point of paranoia – out of which came Beattie’s coruscating reply to Hume. In ‘James
Beattie and the Defence of Common Sense’ (1978), Phillipson explains that Beattie’s reasons for
wanting to destroy the moral scepticism which, so he thought, had Edinburgh in its grip by the
1760s were ‘as much emotional as purely rational’.74 While Reid was able to engage coolly and intel-
lectually with Hume’s theory of mind, Beattie was not. The questions asked by Hume about the
rational basis of our most deeply held beliefs caused Beattie a psychic pain that could only be
relieved by a blanket vindication of any and all beliefs to which we might be deeply emotionally
committed. Phillipson never published a properly developed examination of Reid, but he did
write well on Stewart, in ‘The Pursuit of Virtue in the Scottish University Education: Dugald Stewart
and Scottish Moral Philosophy in the Enlightenment’ (1983). Here Phillipson’s emphasis is on the
way in which the pedagogue Stewart drew out the implications of Reid’s philosophy for the teaching
of practical morality. Stewart believed that Hume and Smith had, perhaps despite themselves,
turned virtue into a mere matter of propriety. This needed to be answered by proof that the
roots of virtue ‘lay in the constitution of mind rather than in the organisation of society’.75 Reid
provided Stewart with proof of just that. Stewart built an intellectualist superstructure on a Reidian
base, effecting a kind of rehabilitation of the rationalism that Hume and Smith had dispensed with,
and intending to show that civic duties were most definitely not, in Phillipson’s words, ‘merely
extensions of market relationships’.76
I noted above that Phillipson was just as sure as those whom Duncan Forbes referred to as ‘the
philosophers’ that Hume’s greatest achievement was A Treatise of Human Nature. Both Hume’s
essays and his History of England were products of his philosophy. So also, according to Phillipson,
were Smith’s two great works, as well as, albeit indirectly, the works of Beattie, Reid, and Stewart. It
is not much of an exaggeration to claim that in fact all of Phillipson’s Scottish Enlightenment had its
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proximate cause in Hume’s first book. Certainly this seems to have been a central claim of the book
on the Scottish Enlightenment that Phillipson was still working on when he died.77 In the proposal
submitted to the book’s prospective publisher in 2012, Phillipson claims that the project of a science
of man, founded by Hume in the Treatise, ‘resulted in the most complete and coherent non-Chris-
tian account of man, society, and history that was to appear in the age of Enlightenment and
remains one of the Enlightenment’s most enduring legacies’.78 Hume’s and Smith’s work on this
enterprise would, however, have been only one element of the story told in the main section of
the book. There were to be chapters on Reid’s Aberdeen, on Robertson, on Scottish theorising
about taste and the fine arts, on Ossian, and on the natural philosophy of William Cullen, Joseph
Black and James Hutton. There would have been further sections on the later phases of the Scottish
Enlightenment, treating the history of Edinburgh University, literary life in the age of Henry Mack-
enzie and Burns, and Scottish reactions to the American and French Revolutions, leading on to a
final chapter on ‘Francis Jeffrey, Walter Scott, and the Last Days of the Scottish Enlightenment’. All
this would have been preceded by a comprehensive restatement of Phillipson’s account of the social
and institutional origins of the Scottish Enlightenment. The book, in other words, would have
woven together all the strands of Phillipson’s work, from the essays of the mid-1970s to the magis-
terial book on Smith that appeared thirty-five years later. We will never know exactly what we were
deprived of by Nick’s death in January 2018.79 But we can be sure that Hume would have been at the
centre of it. The unfinished manuscript contains the statement that Hume’s ‘greatest legacy to his
country as well as to posterity was the despised and disowned Treatise’.80
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